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Combating Corruption through Corporate 




This article builds on the increased attention given to corruption as 
an issue of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and the increased 
enforcement of anti-bribery laws in the United States, to consider how 
enforcement activity can work to improve corporate transparency and 
support initiatives developed in the field of corporate social 
responsibility, such as the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI). Although 
the GRI requires disclosure on anti-corruption matters, currently, few 
companies are providing disclosure on this issue and those that are 
disclosing rarely provide useful information to stakeholders. This article 
shows how recent trends in criminal and civil law enforcement can be 
modified slightly to provide strong incentives for companies to disclose 
information required by the GRI or other social reporting standards. The 
article then shows how the proposal can assist current enforcement 
practices directly, but also indirectly by supporting CSR initiatives 
designed to help combat the enabling environment that allows corruption 
to thrive. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Enforcement of anti-bribery laws under the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act (FCPA)1 has reached a level that was unimaginable just ten 
years ago.2 In each of the last five years the Department of Justice (DOJ) 
 
  Associate Professor of Business Law, University of Michigan. 
 1. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494. 
 2. See Amy Deen Westbrook, Enthusiastic Enforcement, Informal Legislation: The 
Unruly Expansion of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 45 GA. L. REV. 489, 494–96, 
522–23 (2011) (noting radicalization of the FCPA’s enforcement and tremendous increase 
in enforcement activity as compared to the 1980s and 1990s); Lauren Giudice, Regulating 
Corruption: Analyzing Uncertainty in Current Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
Enforcement, 91 B.U.L. REV. 347, 348 (2011)  (noting that between 2006 and 2009 “the 
DOJ has brought about sixty FCPA cases, which is more than the total number of cases 
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has set a record for the number of enforcement actions, with the number 
of enforcement actions in 2010 almost double that of the previous year.3 
In the words of the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division, 
“FCPA enforcement is stronger than it’s ever been – and getting 
stronger.”4 This level of enforcement activity has made the risk of FCPA 
violations a top issue for corporate legal and compliance departments.5 
These departments are unsure how to respond because there is a 
significant level of uncertainty about what actually constitutes a violation 
of the FCPA.6 This makes it difficult for compliance departments to 
provide necessary guidance or to implement effective internal controls, 
especially when faced with the demands of business managers who 
believe their competitors are not playing by the rules.7  
The DOJ encourages corporations to work through these challenges 
themselves and to self-regulate by improving their compliance programs. 
The DOJ does this by granting leniency to corporations that have 
implemented effective FCPA compliance programs, even when their 
employees are caught paying a bribe.8 There are complaints, however, 
that the government is not providing sufficient guidance setting out what 
efforts are necessary to earn this protection.9 The government, in turn, is 
wary of giving this advice for fear that it will allow corporations to create 
 
brought in the thirty-two years between the Act's inception in 1977 and 2005.”); Mike 
Koehler, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in the Ultimate Year of Its Decade of 
Resurgence, 43 IND. L. REV. 389, 389 (2010) (stating that “during the past decade, 
enforcement agencies resurrected the FCPA from near legal extinction.”).  
 3. F. Joseph Warin et al., 2010 Year-End FCPA Update, INSIGHTS: THE CORP. & 
SEC. L. ADVISOR, Jan. 2011, at 26, 26. In short, the Department of Justice (DOJ) is 
responsible for criminal enforcement of the FCPA and the Securities Exchange 
Commission (SEC) is responsible for civil enforcement. Koehler, supra note 2, at 395–
396. 
 4. Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney Gen., Dep’t. of Justice,  Address at the 24th 
National Conference on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 16, 2010) (transcript 
available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2010/crm-speech-101116.html). 
 5. See Jaclyn Jaeger, Bribery Act Setting a New Standard for Compliance, 
COMPLIANCE WK., Jan. 2011, at 1, 1; Melissa Klein Aguilar, FCPA Compliance: Latest, 
Best Practices for Boards, COMPLIANCE WK., Sept. 2010, at 53, 53. 
 6. See generally James R. Doty, Toward a Reg. FCPA: A Modest Proposal for 
Change in Administering the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 62 BUS. LAW. 1233 (2007) 
(describing Doty’s criticisms of FCPA enforcement).  
 7. See generally CONTROL RISKS GROUP LTD. & SIMMONS & SIMMONS, 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS ATTITUDES TO CORRUPTION — SURVEY 2006 5 (2006) 
(providing data on managers’ beliefs that competitors are paying bribes); ERNST & 
YOUNG, CORRUPTION OR COMPLIANCE — WEIGHING THE COSTS: THE 10TH GLOBAL 
FRAUD SURVEY 6 (2008) (providing data on managers who believe corruption is getting 
worse).   
 8. David Hess & Cristie L. Ford, Corporate Corruption and Reform Undertakings: 
A New Approach to an Old Problem, 41 CORNELL INT’L. L.J. 307, 329 (2008). 
 9. See Ronald E. Berenbeim & Jeffery Kaplan, Ethics and Compliance Enforcement 
Decisions – the Information Gap, in EXECUTIVE ACTION SERIES, at 1, 2 (The Conference 
Board, Ser. No. 310, 2009). 
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the appearance of self-regulation through compliance programs which 
are easily evaded by employees or exist only on paper.10 This article 
considers how the DOJ can work toward solving these problems by using 
and enhancing existing transparency initiatives in the fight against 
corruption. 
There is a strong need for the production and dissemination of new 
types of information related to the challenges of combating corruption. 
The government needs information about the value of corporate efforts 
made towards compliance in order to implement a more effective “credit 
for compliance” program.11 Corporations need information that will 
allow them to adopt the anti-bribery best practices of other players, and 
information to assure them that their competitors are abiding by their 
commitments to combat corruption. Increasingly, other stakeholders, 
such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and social investors, are 
also seeking information on corporate anti-bribery efforts so that they can 
serve as surrogate regulators, pressuring corporations to live up to their 
anti-bribery commitments, as well as assisting them in those efforts.12 In 
each of these ways, the development and use of new information can help 
to combat the environments that allow corruption to thrive.13 
A key first step in taking advantage of these opportunities is 
conceptualizing anti-corruption as an issue of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR), and not simply as an issue of legal compliance. Just 
a decade ago, the topic of anti-corruption was excluded from many major 
CSR initiatives,14 but in the last few years it has become a central topic.15 
 
 10. William S. Laufer, Corporate Liability, Risk Shifting, and the Paradox of 
Compliance, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1343, 1407–1408 (1999).  See Kimberly D. Krawiec, 
Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 81 WASH. U. L. Q. 487, 
491–92 (2003).  
 11. See generally Cristie L. Ford, Toward a New Model for Securities Law 
Enforcement, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 757, 788–92 (2005) (discussing how the government 
would have to go through an enormous amount of information from a corporation to 
determine which compliance programs are effective and which ones are not). 
 12. See infra Part IV.C.1–C.2. 
 13. See infra Part IV.C.1–C.2. 
 14. Despite corruption’s link to human rights violations, see INT’L COUNCIL ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS & TRANSPARENCY INT’L, CORRUPTION AND HUMAN RIGHTS: MAKING 
THE CONNECTION 5–7 (2009), and other social and economic ills, see generally Elizabeth 
Spahn, Nobody Gets Hurt?, 41 GEO. J. INT'L L. 861 (2010) (explaining the ramifications of 
bribery on international economic and societal interplay), it was a forgotten component of 
CSR until recently. For example, two of most well-known and influential CSR initiatives 
did not initially include the topic of corruption, but only added that element later. First, the 
most well-known set of standards on sustainability reporting, published by the Global 
Reporting Initiative, did not include disclosure requirements on corruption in their first 
edition. David Hess & Thomas W. Dunfee, Taking Responsibility for Bribery: The 
Multinational Corporation’s Role in Combating Corruption, in BUSINESS AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS: DILEMMAS AND SOLUTIONS 260, 269 (Rory Sullivan ed., 2003). Secondly, the 
original version of the United Nations Global Compact only had nine principles none of 
which included corruption. It was only later that the 10th principle on fighting corruption 
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Viewing anti-corruption as an issue of CSR does not mean that 
combating corruption is a purely elective activity, akin to corporate 
philanthropy; it means that anti-corruption efforts involve acting 
consistent with ethical values16 and it means taking actions that 
simultaneously create economic value for the corporation and social 
value for society.17 
As in other areas of CSR, government intervention may directly 
mandate certain behavior, but it may also use the threat of such mandates 
to cast a shadow over private actors, encouraging corporations to 
improve their behavior to avoid regulatory action.18 Governments have 
many ways of creating an “enabling environment” for CSR,19 such as by 
endorsing, facilitating, or partnering with private and civil sector 
entities.20 This article adds to the repertoire of government intervention 
by exploring how the typically more adversarial approach of civil and 
 
was added. Peter Eigen, Removing a Roadblock to Development: Transparency 
International Mobilizes Coalitions Against Corruption, INNOVATIONS, Spring 2008, at 19, 
29. The explanation for these omissions is unclear, perhaps because CSR is often viewed 
as a corporation voluntarily going beyond compliance with the law, while a corporation 
fighting corruption and bribery is viewed as mere compliance with the law. In addition, 
corruption is often viewed as something that is forced on corporations by government 
officials (the demand side of corruption), as opposed to something that corporations inflict 
on others (e.g., human rights violations or pollution of the environment).  
 15. The issue of corruption is now included in leading standards on corporate social 
responsibility, such as the United Nations (UN) Global Compact. U.N. Global Compact, 
The Ten Principles: Transparency and Anti-Corruption (June 24, 2004), 
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/index.html. 
 16. See Alexander Dahlsrud, How Corporate Social Responsibility is Defined: An 
Analysis of 37 Definitions, CORP. SOC. RESP. & ENVTL. MGMT., Nov. 2006, at 1, 8 (2006) 
(quoting the organization Business for Social Responsibility) (“Corporate social 
responsibility is achieving commercial success in ways that honour ethical values and 
respect people, communities and the natural environment.”). 
 17.  Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Creating Shared Value: How to Reinvent 
Capitalism—and Unleash a Wave of Innovation and Growth, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.–Feb. 
2011, at 62, 66 (“Shared value creation focuses on identifying and expanding the 
connections between societal and economic progress.”). See generally Michael E. Porter & 
Mark R. Kramer, Strategy & Society: The Link Between Competitive Advantage and 
Corporate Social Responsibility, HARV. BUS. REV., Dec. 2006, at 78, 83-84 (discussing 
the concept of “shared value”). 
 18. Aneel Karnani, “Doing Well by Doing Good”: The Grand Illusion, CAL. MGMT. 
REV., Winter 2011, at 69, 83 (“It is primarily the role of the government to force 
companies to change behavior to be congruent with the public interest.”). See generally 
Thomas P. Lyon, ‘Green’ Firms Bearing Gifts, REGULATION, Fall 2003, at 36, 37-38 
(describing how corporations use self-regulation, or at least the appearance of self-
regulation, to avoid stricter regulation). 
 19. TOM FOX ET AL., THE WORLD BANK, PUBLIC SECTOR ROLES IN 
STRENGTHENING CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: A BASELINE STUDY iii (2009). 
 20. Id. at iv; see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO 05-744, 
GLOBALIZATION: NUMEROUS FEDERAL ACTIVITIES COMPLEMENT U.S. BUSINESS’S 
GLOBAL CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY EFFORTS 16-18 (2005); Reinhard Steurer, 
The Role of Governments in Corporate Social Responsibility: Characterising Public 
Policies on CSR in Europe, 43 POL’Y SCI. 49, 57 (2010). 
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criminal law enforcement can be used to encourage the disclosure of 
information, which in turn can be utilized by investors, NGOs, similar 
corporations and other stakeholders to further the ultimate purposes of 
the anti-bribery laws.  
Part II of this article explains the difficulties of combating 
corruption. Part III discusses global initiatives to encourage corporations 
to provide disclosure on corruption issues, and it evaluates the 
effectiveness of these practices. Finally, Part IV explains how the DOJ’s 
FCPA enforcement practices can be used to encourage this practice of 
disclosure and why doing so should be expected to produce significant 
benefits.  
II.  THE PROBLEM OF CORRUPTION 
A.  CORRUPTION CONTINUES 
Preventing the use of bribes in domestic and international business 
is one of the most challenging problems facing regulators.21  Although 
corporations may complain about the enforcement of the FCPA,22 they 
have many reasons to prefer a corruption-free environment. Corporations 
attempting to operate in corrupt environments face unpredictable and 
highly frustrating difficulties that create numerous direct and indirect 
costs.23 Despite the long-term benefits to a corporation of operating in a 
 
 21. The challenge is seen as a paradox in that “corruption is universally disapproved 
yet universally prevalent.” David Hess & Thomas W. Dunfee, Fighting Corruption: A 
Principled Approach; The C2 Principles (Combating Corruption), 33 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 
593, 595 (2000). This paradox seemingly creates a never-ending cycle of corrupt business 
practices, as Gerald Caiden explains, “Attempts to combat corruption on the metaphysical 
level seems doomed to failure since human nature is inherently flawed. In spite of any 
progress that is secured, corruption spawns like a plague unless vigilantly suppressed. 
Even then, corruption can never be fully eradicated and forever lurks in the background, 
ready to undermine whatever development has been realized, threatening to destroy 
civilization itself.” Gerald E. Caiden, A Cautionary Tale: Ten Major Flaws in Combating 
Corruption, 10 SW. J. L. & TRADE AM. 269, 271 (2004). 
 22. See Mike Koehler, The Facade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT'L L. 907 
(2010), for a thorough review of the criticisms. Violations of the FCPA can also be costly 
for corporations. In addition to multimillion dollar penalties, corporations can face 
reputational damage for violations of the FCPA that may be even more significant. 
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, CONFRONTING CORRUPTION: THE BUSINESS CASE FOR AN 
EFFECTIVE ANTI-CORRUPTION PROGRAMME 5 (2008). 
 23. The direct costs include not only the cost of the bribe, but also such costs as 
bureaucratic delay, attempting to avoid situations where bribes are likely to be demanded, 
and others.  Jonathon P. Doh et al., Coping With Corruption in Foreign Markets, ACAD. 
MGMT. EXECUTIVE, Aug. 2003, at 114, 115–17. Indirect costs for corporations include 
having to operate in a country with distorted public expenditures, a weak infrastructure, 
and other socio-economic problems. Id. at 118. The magnitude of these costs on 
corporations depends on the pervasiveness of corruption and the arbitrariness of it, for 
example not knowing if payment of a bribe has solved a problem or created additional new 
problems. Id. at 118–19. 
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corruption-free business environment, short-term pressures frequently 
cause corporations to take actions that perpetuate the corrupt 
environment.24 The result is what Professor Nichols describes as an 
assurance problem.25 He states: 
[A]n assurance problem exists when actors are best off if they cooperate with 
one another, but in the event of cheating by another actor are better off if they 
themselves also cheat than they would be if they continued to comply with the 
rules. As the actors cannot monitor one another, they face uncertainty as to 
which course of action will yield the best result.26 
In the absence of assurance that others will not resort to corruption, 
corporations “must choose between cooperating in hopes of accruing the 
greatest benefit or defecting as a defensive measure.”27  
This assurance problem is demonstrated by the facts of a recent 
criminal FCPA case. When faced with a request from a government 
official for an illegal payment to win a contract, a manager at Baker 
Hughes, Inc. told one of the company’s vice-presidents that “We are in 
the driving seat but if one [of] our competitors comes in with a pot of 
gold, it is not going to be our contract.”28 Competitive pressure, 
combined with the perception of others’ willingness to pay bribes, 
provided a strong incentive for the managers to give in.29 A manager at 
Baker Hughes stated that the bribe request was “distasteful,” but in the 
end the company made the requested payment.30 
Ordinarily, the primary solution for assurance problems is the 
imposition of sanctions against defectors.31 Thus, one would expect 
increased enforcement of the FCPA should help deter corrupt payments. 
But there is reason to be skeptical that increased enforcement will 
significantly reduce corruption any time soon. The general consensus of 
 
 24. See Philip M. Nichols, Corruption as an Assurance Problem, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. 
REV. 1307, 1326–28 (2004). 
 25. Philip M. Nichols, Multiple Communities and Controlling Corruption, 88 J. BUS. 
ETHICS 805, 805 (2009).  
 26. Id.  
 27. Nichols, supra note 24, at 1310. 
 28. Deferred Prosecution Agreement, Attachment A at 4, 7–8, United States v. Baker 
Hughes Inc., No. 4:07-cr-00130-1 (S.D. Tex. 2007) available at 
http://www.law.virginia.edu/pdf/faculty/garrett/bakerhughes.pdf; Compl. at 9–10, SEC v. 
Baker Hughes Inc., No. 07-cv-1408 (S.D. Tex. 2007) available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2007/comp20094.pdf. 
 29. See Deferred Prosecution Agreement, Attachment A at 4, 7–8 United States v. 
Baker Hughes Inc., No. 4:07-cr-00130-1 (S.D. Tex. 2007)  available at 
http://www.law.virginia.edu/pdf/faculty/garrett/bakerhughes.pdf (the company chose to 
make the payment after an employee expressed concern that the contract might be lost 
without it). 
 30. Compl. at 9–10, SEC v. Baker Hughes Inc., No. 07-cv-1408 (S.D. Tex. 2007) 
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2007/comp20094.pdf. 
 31. Nichols, supra note 24, at 1310 (but this response is not always effective in 
industries where corruption is prevalent). 
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business managers is that corrupt payments will continue to be a common 
activity. 
A 2010 Transparency International survey, with over 90,000 
respondents in eighty-six countries,32 found that a majority of people 
believed that corruption had increased over the previous three years.33 
Among respondents from the European Union and North America, over 
two-thirds of respondents believed there had been an increase.34 In a 
study focused more specifically on business, Ernst and Young found that, 
although 23% of managers throughout the world thought regulatory 
enforcement had been “significantly stronger” over the last five years, 
over one-third also thought that the problem of corruption was getting 
worse.35 Another recent survey found that 28% of U.S. managers thought 
corruption would increase in the next five years, 54% thought it would 
stay the same, and only 12% thought there would be a decrease.36 The 
recent financial crisis also does not help matters. Pressures to protect the 
company and for managers to protect personal bonuses, may lead 
employees to believe that corrupt payments are necessary in the current 
environment.37  
Furthermore, the current environment in many countries is getting 
worse. In Pakistan, the results of a national survey suggest that corruption 
increased 400% from 2006 to 2009.38 Similarly, a 2006 survey of 
 
 32. TRANSPARENCY INT’L, GLOBAL CORRUPTION BAROMETER 2 (2010), available 
at http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/gcb/2010/results. 
 33. Id. at 5. 
 34. Id. 
 35. ERNST & YOUNG, CORRUPTION OR COMPLIANCE – WEIGHING THE COSTS  6 
(2008), available at 
http://info.worldbank.org/etools/antic/docs/Resources/Corruption_or_compliance_weighin
g_the_costs.pdf (survey of managers about their impressions of corruption levels). The 
survey data was based on telephone interviews with 1,186 managers in large corporations 
from 33 different countries. Id. at 22. The interviews were conducted between November 
2007 and February 2008. Id. 
 36. CONTROL RISKS GROUP, supra note 7, at 21 (chart of respondents’ expectations 
of whether corruptions would increase, stay the same, or decrease, delineated by country). 
The remaining six percent indicated that they “did not know.” Id. Similar results were 
obtained from managers in other countries. Id. 
 37. See generally ERNST & YOUNG, EUROPEAN FRAUD SURVEY 2009 5–6, 19 
(2009), available at 
http://www.eycom.ch/publications/items/fraud_eu_2009/200904_EY_European_Fraud_Su
rvey.pdf (showing that the more difficult the economic environment becomes, the more 
likely it is that individuals will commit fraud and cave to bribery demands). See also 
RONALD E. BERENBEIM, CONFERENCE BOARD RESEARCH REPORT: RESISTING 
CORRUPTION 9 (2006) (noting that many managers believe that the FCPA does not deter 
bribery because of the strong belief that bribery is something that has to be done in some 
countries to succeed). 
 38. Press Release, Transparency International Pakistan, Corruption in Last Three 
Years has Increased 400% (June 17, 2009), available at 
http://www.transparency.org.pk/documents/NCPS%202009/PRESS%20RELEASE%20N
CPS%202009%20Final%20(English).pdf. These numbers come from a national survey 
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executives by Control Risks Group found that 23% of U.S. managers 
believed that their company had lost business in the last year due to a 
competitor paying a bribe, and 44% believed that this had occurred in the 
last five years.39 This was an increase from 2002, when the survey found 
that 18% believed they had lost business due to bribes in the last year and 
32% believed that this had occurred in the last five years.40 Ernst and 
Young obtained similar results in a 2008 survey, in which 24% of 
respondents indicated that they had experienced an incident of bribery 
within the last two years.41 
To reduce the supply of bribes, corporations must act to fill the gaps 
left by legal enforcement. Corporations can do this by making a 
commitment to anti-corruption, demonstrating that commitment to 
competitors and to other stakeholders, and by allowing that commitment 
to be monitored. By encouraging appropriate transparency, government 
enforcement action can play an indirect but valuable role in increasing 
corporate adoption of these practices. The exact nature of the required 
transparency and its benefits are described below,42 but first it is 
important to discuss the anti-corruption commitment that is needed from 
corporations. 
B.  COMPLIANCE CHALLENGES 
To prevent the payment of bribes, corporations must adopt effective 
ethics and compliance programs.43 These programs require corporations 
to conduct risk assessments to determine when potential bribe payments 
are most likely; to implement internal controls, with a special focus on 
the identified high-risk areas; to provide employees with training on 
ethics, anti-corruption laws, and the company’s code of conduct; to 
implement a system for employees to report any suspected violations; 
and to establish punishments for rule violators.44 In the United States, the 
government provides strong incentives for corporations to adopt such 
programs by using the quality of a corporation’s compliance program in 
determining whether or not to prosecute the corporation for FCPA 
 
conducted by the Pakistan chapter of Transparency International. The press release 
concludes by stating “The NCP survey 2009 results confirms that Pakistan has Laws, but 
not the Rule of Law.” Id. 
 39. CONTROL RISKS GROUP, supra note 7, at 5. 
 40. Id. 
 41. ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 35, at 5. In addition, 18% of respondents stated that 
their company had lost business in the last two years to a competitor that paid a bribe. Id.   
 42. See infra Part III.B and Part IV.C. 
 43. See Mike Koehler, The Unique FCPA Compliance Challenges of Doing Business 
in China, 25 WIS. INT’L L.J. 397, 430 (2007). 
 44. For an overview of FCPA compliance programs, see generally MARTIN T. 
BIEGELMAN & DANIEL R. BIEGELMAN, FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT: 
COMPLIANCE GUIDEBOOK 215–17 (2010) (list of factors). 
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violations.45 The quality of the compliance program also plays a role in 
determining the severity of a corporation’s sentence if it is convicted of 
violating the FCPA.46  
Despite the strong incentives provided by these enforcement 
activities, many corporations still have not implemented a program that 
appropriately identifies and guards against risks of corruption.47 One 
survey found that “[o]nly 25% percent of respondents say their company 
performs proactive risk assessments or monitoring” on corrupt 
payments.48 Additionally, only “40% of respondents believe their 
controls are effective at identifying high-risk business partners or 
suspicious disbursements.”49 Smaller corporations were even less 
confident in the implementation of their compliance programs.50 In the 
summer of 2008, which began the DOJ’s increased focus on FCPA 
enforcement, a similar survey found that although a majority of 
respondents had anti-bribery policies and training programs in place, less 
than half had developed protocols for conducting risk assessments or 
continuous monitoring of compliance.51 The anti-bribery policies of the 
surveyed companies were rarely distributed to third party representatives 
or suppliers, and the companies rarely provided training to those third 
parties.52 Thus, it is not surprising that, when companies operating in 
high risk environments for corruption were examined by an independent 
research organization, only 10% of those companies met the research 
organization’s standards for a “good” or “adequate” response for 
preventing wrongful payments.53  
 
 45. Robert W. Tarun & Peter P. Tomczak, A Proposal for a United States 
Department of Justice Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Leniency Policy, 47 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 153, 166–170 (2010) (describing federal agents’ considerations in deciding whether 
or not to prosecute). 
 46. Id. at 162–63. 
 47. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 22, at 13. Some commentators 
argue that even for companies that attempt to implement a comprehensive FCPA 
compliance program, there will be significant challenges in designing many aspects of the 
program because of the government’s unclear and changing enforcement practices. 
Westbrook, supra note 2, at 498–99. For example, Westbrook states: “Given the present 
state of confusion about what the law actually requires, it is unclear how to design an 
efficient and effective compliance program. As a result, FCPA compliance programs are 
likely to be overly expensive, and probably insufficiently effective.” Id. 
 48. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 22, at 14. This was a survey of 390 
senior level executives from companies throughout the world. Id. at 2. 
 49. Id. at 14. 
 50. See id. at 17 (comparing corporations over $10 billion in annual revenue to those 
under that amount). 
 51. KPMG FORENSIC, 2008 ANTI-BRIBERY AND ANTI-CORRUPTION SURVEY 4–5 
(2008). 
 52. Id. at 5–6. 29% of respondents indicated that their policies were distributed to 
third party representatives and 27% distributed the policies to suppliers and vendors. Id. 
 53. BOB GORDON, THE STATE OF RESPONSIBLE BUSINESS 2008, 24 (2008), 
available at www.eiris.org/files/research%20publications/stateofrespbusinesssep08.pdf. 
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These basic flaws in corporate compliance programs lead to a lack 
of awareness of anti-corruption laws on the part of managers. One survey 
found that 42% of international business development directors for U.S. 
corporations considered themselves to be “totally ignorant” about the 
FCPA.54 A different survey found that this number increased to 56% 
when the pool of respondents included managers of Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) registered companies—who are therefore 
subject to the FCPA—whether or not the managers are based in the 
United States.55 
One example of the impact of this ignorance is seen in the use of 
intermediaries in other countries. Intermediaries are those local 
individuals or organizations that a corporation hires to help it conduct 
business in that particular country. The use of intermediaries creates great 
risks of corrupt payments being made on the corporation’s behalf, 
thereby exposing the corporation to FCPA liability.56 One survey found 
that one-third of U.S. managers believed that U.S. corporations regularly 
used intermediaries in an attempt to avoid violating the FCPA.57 Many 
felt that it is nearly impossible to comply with the forms and procedures 
for getting necessary export licenses and would use an intermediary to 
get around those rules.58 In a misunderstanding of the FCPA, many 
managers believe that it is not their company’s problem if the 
intermediary pays bribes, as “it comes out of their commission” or it is 
not the company’s place to tell the intermediary how to run their 
business.59 These managers also wrongly believe that an intermediary’s 
use of bribes would create a legal problem only for the intermediary, and 
not their own company.60 
Overall, it is clear that enforcement of anti-corruption laws must be 
supplemented with additional regulatory approaches. These approaches 
 
These findings were based on data collected by Experts in Responsible Investment 
Solutions (EIRIS). EIRIS provides independent research for investors on corporations’ 
environmental, social, and governance (ESG) performance.  Id. at 13. The research was 
based on data collected through September 2008 on the 2,344 companies in the FTSE All-
World Developed Index. Id. For corruption research, 649 of those companies were 
categorized as being at “high risk” for operating in corrupt environments or industries with 
a high risk of corruption. Id. at 13, 24. 
 54. CONTROL RISKS GROUP, supra note 7, at 10. An Ernst and Young survey 
conducted in late 2007 to early 2008 found that 31 percent of U.S. managers had “never 
heard of or knew nothing about the FCPA.” ERNST AND YOUNG, supra note 35, at 17. 
 55. ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 35, at 17. 
 56. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 22, at 14–15; Koehler, supra note 2, at 
399–403. 
 57. CONTROL RISKS GROUP, supra note 7, at 13. An additional 44% believed U.S. 
corporations used intermediaries for this purpose occasionally. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 18. 
 60. Id. 
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must deal with the problems identified above, including the assurance 
problem61 and poorly implemented compliance programs.62 Ideally, these 
new approaches would encourage cooperation between corporations, as 
well as cooperation with government agencies and other stakeholders of 
the organization.63 Cooperation is needed in order to develop and spread 
best practices for implementing more effective compliance programs, and 
it is also helps to ensure that all corporations are playing by the same 
rules. This is where an appropriately structured transparency program can 
create significant benefits. 
III.  THE ROLE OF TRANSPARENCY IN COMBATING 
CORRUPTION 
A.  TRANSPARENCY THROUGH CORPORATE SOCIAL REPORTING 
In policy debates centered around corporate accountability for social 
and environmental performance, transparency is always part of the 
discussion, if not the default approach.64 Often this transparency focuses 
on corporate social reporting—also known as sustainability reporting or 
non-financial reporting.65 Corporations use social reporting to disclose 
the processes they use to manage CSR issues and their performance on 
these matters.66 With this information, stakeholders—such as customers, 
shareholders, and NGOs—can seek to hold corporations accountable and 
pressure them to improve performance if needed.67  
Although corporations might not be expected to voluntarily disclose 
information that stakeholders will use to criticize their performance and 
force them to make greater resource commitments to CSR-related 
matters, in fact, corporations have rapidly adopted social reporting 
 
61.    See supra notes 25–31 and accompanying text. 
 62. See supra notes 48–53 and accompanying text. 
 63. See Thomas W. Dunfee & David Hess, Getting From Salbu to the ‘Tipping 
Point’, 21 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 471, 472–73 (2001). 
 64. See, e.g., Dominique Bessire, Corporate Social Responsibility: From 
Transparency to ‘Constructive Conflict’,  in THE ASHGATE RESEARCH COMPANION TO 
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 65, 65 (David Crowther & Nicholas Capaldi eds., 
2008) (“[In the domains of CSR and corporate governance] the necessity for transparency 
is taken for granted and is very seldom questioned.”). 
 65. See id. at 66–67; David Hess, The Three Pillars of Corporate Social Reporting as 
New Governance Regulation: Disclosure, Dialogue and Development, 18 BUS. ETHICS Q. 
447, 447  (2008) [hereinafter Hess, Three Pillars] (“[O]ver the past decade corporate 
social reporting has established itself as a key element in the movement for making 
corporations more socially responsible.”) 
 66. See generally infra notes 89–95 and accompanying text (providing an overview 
of the GRI reporting standards). 
 67. See Klaus Dingwerth & Margot Eichinger, Tamed Transparency: How 
Information Disclosure Under the Global Reporting Initiative Fails to Empower, 10 
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 74, 74 (2010). 
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practices in the past 10 years.68 The majority of the largest corporations 
in the United States and the world now issue such reports.69 This 
significant growth is primarily attributable to the efforts of the Global 
Reporting Initiative (GRI), which has produced the leading guidelines for 
structuring these social reports.70 The GRI has convinced corporations 
that social reports can help them better manage CSR issues and 
demonstrate their commitment to CSR to skeptical stakeholders.71 
There is a significant difference, however, between adopting social 
reporting practices and actually producing quality social reports. Many 
stakeholders complain about the incompleteness of information in the 
reports, the lack of consistency from year to year, the inability to 
compare social report data between companies, and numerous other 
problems.72 Many commentators question if anyone is even reading the 
reports due to these problems.73 One commentator, writing on this 
 
 68. See Allison M. Snyder, Holding Multinational Corporations Accountable: Is 
Non-Financial Disclosure the Answer, 2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 565, 568–71 (2007). 
 69. Adam Sulkowski & Steven White, Financial Performance, Pollution Measures, 
and the Propensity to Use Corporate Responsibility Reporting: Implications for Business 
and Legal Scholarship, 21 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 491, 494 (2010) (“of the 
largest 250 corporations in the world (the Global Fortune 250 or "G250"), seventy-nine 
percent issued a stand-alone CR report in 2008 (up from 52% in 2005)”); Michael R. 
Siebecker, Trust & Transparency: Promoting Efficient Corporate Disclosure Through 
Fiduciary -Based Discourse, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 115, 127 (2009) (reporting that 
approximately 50% of the S&P 100 Index issued such reports in 2008). 
 70.  Iris H-Y Chiu, Standardization in Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting 
and a Universalist Concept of CSR?: A Path Paved with Good Intentions, 22 FLA. J. INT'L 
L. 361, 366–67 (2010) (citing KPMG INT’L, KPMG INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF 
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORTING 2008, at 36–38 (2008) [hereinafter KPMG 2008 
REPORTING SURVEY], available at 
http://www.kpmg.com/Global/en/IssuesandInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/Inter
national-corporate-responsibility-survey-2008.pdf); Dingwerth & Eichinger, supra note 
67, at 76. 
 71. See Sulkowski & White, supra note 69, at 497 (explaining survey data shows 
important motivations behind adopting social reporting practices include improving 
reputation and brand, and risk management) (citing KPMG 2008 REPORTING SURVEY, 
supra note 69, at 18). 
 72. See Chiu, supra note 70, at 364  (“as CSR reports are narrative in nature, and not 
susceptible to being evaluated upon objective standards such as accounting standards, they 
are often criticized to be incomparable, vague, and subjective.”); Siebecker, supra note 69, 
at 122 (describing a “tragedy of transparency” where a “confluence of factors that create 
incentives for corporations to dissemble or to embrace a kind of strategic ambiguity in 
their public communications.”). The “tragedy of transparency” is detailed in a summary of 
a study of the automobile industry. See also Dingwerth & Eichinger, supra note 67, at 88  
("In sum, our brief analysis of actual GRI reports suggests that even though all companies 
claim full coverage of the [greenhouse gas] indicators, the information they provide is of 
limited practical use. A look at other indicators confirms this finding. Thus, quantitative 
data are not always gathered systematically and reported completely, while qualitative 
information appears unbalanced and often fails to include a credible assessment of the 
sustainability impacts of various measures taken by a reporting organization.”). 
 73. Dingwerth & Eichinger, supra note 67, at 89–90 (finding that NGOs are only 
marginally using social reports in their activities). 
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“transparency tragedy,” says of CSR communications more generally 
that: “[p]erhaps somewhat oddly, it is not simply the lack of information 
that causes the tragedy. Instead, it can also be high volume and low 
quality of information that . . . render assessing the truth or falsity of 
corporate communications increasingly difficult.”74 
These quality problems create a vicious cycle. Because stakeholders 
do not use the existing reports, they apply less pressure on corporations 
to adopt social reporting practices or to improve their reports.75 In effect, 
corporations are using social reports more for purposes of brand and 
reputation management than for the provision of useful information,76 
causing stakeholders to further reduce their demand of social reports.  
Though these trends raise concerns about social reporting’s current 
trajectory, stakeholders have not given up on transparency for improving 
corporate social performance. Instead, they have focused on refining the 
nature of information disclosed and the incentives behind producing 
social reports. Investors and NGOs have pushed for disclosure of more 
specific types of information, as opposed to general social reports 
containing information based on a company’s own assessment of what 
issues meet the GRI standard of “materiality.”77 The leading example of 
this trend toward specificity is the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP), 
which requires corporations to disclose information related to greenhouse 
gases and climate change issues.78 As in the early stages of social 
reporting in the last decade, there has been rapid growth in CDP 
disclosure, but there are also significant complaints about the quality of 
that information.79  
A second major development in the last few years has been the 
greater involvement of governments in mandating the production of 
social reports, or disclosure of information typically included in social 
 
 74. Siebecker, supra note 69, at 128. 
 75. A study suggests that “GRI is losing momentum, at least in the United States, 
primarily due to a failure to deliver value to various stakeholders. Investors remain 
unconvinced that [non- financial reporting] is valuable in the pricing of financial assets, 
companies are expressing doubts about the payoffs from social performance, and NGOs 
are not finding GRI data to be particularly useful in their campaigns.” David L. Levy et al., 
The Contested Politics of Corporate Governance: The Case of the Global Reporting 
Initiative, 49 BUS. & SOCIETY 88, 90–91 (2010). 
 76. See supra  note 71. 
 77. Dingwerth & Eichinger, supra note 70, at 82–83 (describing the GRI’s concept 
of “materiality,” which is the standard for determining what information should be 
included in the sustainability report). 
 78. For an overview of the CDP, see Soo-Yeun Lim, Mandatory Corporate 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Disclosure to Encourage Corporate Self-Regulation of 
Emissions Reduction, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 854, 862–63 (2008). 
 79. Ans Kolk et al., Corporate Responses in an Emerging Climate Regime: The 
Institutionalization and Commensuration of Carbon Disclosure, 17 EURO. ACCOUNTING 
REV. 719, 741 (2008). 
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reports. For example, in 2008, Sweden began requiring state-owned 
enterprises to publish social reports in accordance with the GRI.80 In 
2009, the Danish Government expanded existing disclosure requirements 
on environmental matters to include disclosure on CSR issues in 
general.81 Also in 2009, South Africa updated its voluntary code of 
corporate governance82 to require integrated reporting, which combines 
environmental, social and governance (ESG) data in required financial 
reports.83 
These actions demonstrate a global trend toward governmental 
involvement in CSR reporting.84 Although the question of whether social 
reports should be mandatory or voluntary is as old as the idea of social 
reports itself,85 there are now more serious discussions centered around 
“how” mandatory reporting should occur.86 For example, Lydenberg and 
colleagues have produced a detailed proposal for a mandatory system 
based on a limited set of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) for separate 
industry sectors.87 
 
 80. UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, KPMG, GLOBAL REPORTING 
INITIATIVE & UNIT FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA, CARROTS AND STICKS - 
PROMOTING TRANSPARENCY AND SUSTAINABILITY: AN UPDATE ON TRENDS IN 
VOLUNTARY AND MANDATORY APPROACHES TO SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING 13, 66–67 
(2010), available at 
http://www.kpmg.com/ZA/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Advisory-
Publications/Documents/Carrots_Sticks_2010.pdf. 
 81. Id. at 13, 39–40. 
 82. Institute of Directors in Southern Africa, King III Code of Governance Principles 
for South Africa 13 (2009), available at 
http://african.ipapercms.dk/IOD/KINGIII/kingiiicode/.  
 83. UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, supra note 80, at 62–63. 
 84. Id. at 13. 
 85. An early argument for mandatory social reporting can be found in Meinolf 
Dierkes, Whither Corporate Social Reporting: Is it Time to Legislate?, 28 CAL. MGMT. 
REV. 106, 107 (1986). For an overview of the arguments surrounding the voluntary versus 
mandatory debate, see generally UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, supra 
note 80, at 9–15. 
 86. See ROBERT G. ECCLES & MICHAEL P. KRZUS, ONE REPORT: INTEGRATED 
REPORTING FOR A SUSTAINABLE SOCIETY  219–22 (2010) (arguing for mandating 
“integrated reporting,” which combines  sustainability reporting information and  
traditional financial information into one integrated report); STEVE LYDENBERG ET AL., 
FROM TRANSPARENCY TO PERFORMANCE: INDUSTRY BASED SUSTAINABILITY 
REPORTING ON KEY ISSUES 5–12 (2010), available at http://hausercenter.org/iri/wp-
content/uploads/2010/05/IRI_Transparency-to-Performance.pdf (arguing for a mandatory 
system based on specific indicators for different industries). The debate over government 
intervention is not simply on whether social reports should be mandated, but also on the 
exploration of other types of intervention. For example, in 2009, the European 
Commission held workshops on how to improve the disclosure on ESG issues, and 
considered the pros and cons of various regulatory interventions. An overview of the 
conference and summary of the sessions is available at the website of the European 
Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sustainable-business/corporate-social-
responsibility/reporting-disclosure/swedish-presidency/index_en.htm. 
 87. LYDENBERG ET AL., supra note 86, at 5–12. 
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B.  CURRENT SOCIAL REPORTING PRACTICES ON CORRUPTION 
1.  Social Reporting Guidelines 
There is no universally accepted guide for what information should 
be included in a social report,88 but the leading standard for sustainability 
reports are produced by the non-profit organization GRI.89   
The most recent version of the GRI standards sets out both the 
process that corporations should use to develop the content of their 
reports and the exact information to be included in the reports.90 The 
main body of the report consists of disclosures addressed toward a 
corporation’s general management approach and toward its performance 
with respect to various specified categories of economic, environmental, 
and social issues.91 The “social” category is sub-divided into categories 
on labor practices, human rights, society, and product responsibility,92 
and within the “society” category are three “core” required metrics 
related to corruption.93 The reporting corporation must disclose: (1) what 
business units it has analyzed for corruption risks; (2) the training 
provided to employees on the corporation’s anti-corruption policies; and 
(3) how the company has responded to any incidents of corruption related 
to its business activities.94 In addition to these performance indicators, 
the GRI requires corporations to disclose their general management 
approach to corruption.95 This includes disclosure of the corporation’s 
policies on corruption, its operational responsibilities, and its monitoring 
procedures.96 
 
 88. Chiu, supra note 70, at 366. 
 89. See generally GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, http://www.globalreporting.org 
(last visited Nov. 10, 2011) (describing the Global Reporting Initiative).   
 90. See generally, GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING 
GUIDELINES (2006), available at 
http://www.globalreporting.org/NR/rdonlyres/ED9E9B36-AB54-4DE1-BFF2-
5F735235CA44/0/G3_GuidelinesENU.pdf [hereinafter GRI G3] (providing sustainability 
reporting guidelines to corporations). 
 91. Id. at 24. In addition, the corporation is required to provide disclosures on such 
matters as its general strategy as related to sustainability issues, the organization’s general 
profile, and the stakeholders it engaged in helping determine the content of the report. Id. 
at 19–24. 
 92. Id. at 24. 
 93. Id. at 34. 
 94. Id. The GRI also offers further explanations of the categories. GLOBAL 
REPORTING INITIATIVE, INDICATOR PROTOCOLS SET SOCIETY (2006), available at 
http://www.globalreporting.org/NR/rdonlyres/218C2A97-69C0-4092-A3FD-
0B4DFD8F9A86/0/G3IndicatorProtocolsSociety2011.pdf (providing additional detail on 
what should be disclosed in these core indicators on corruption). 
 95. The disclosures on management approach are not specific as to corruption, but 
are described generally as applying to all matters falling under the “society” category. GRI 
G3, supra note 90, at 33. 
 96. Id. at 33–34. 
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In 2009, Transparency International and the United Nations (UN) 
Global Compact published Reporting Guidance on the 10th Principle 
Against Corruption.97 This document provides corporations with more 
guidance than is contained in the GRI framework on producing 
disclosure information on corruption issues. This guidance divides 
reporting indicators into levels classified as “basic” or “desired.”98 These 
indicators cover the categories of: (1) commitment and policy; (2) 







 97. U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT & TRANSPARENCY INT’L, REPORTING GUIDANCE ON 
THE 10TH PRINCIPLE AGAINST CORRUPTION (2009), available at 
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/issues_doc/Anti-
Corruption/UNGC_AntiCorruptionReporting.pdf [hereinafter U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT, 
REPORTING GUIDANCE]. 
 98. Id. at 12–13. 
 99. Id. at 14. 
 100. This table is adapted from the U.N. Global Compact and Transparency 
International report. Id. at 14. 
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Table 1: UN Global Compact 10th Principle Guidance.  
“B” designates “basic” indicator and “D” designates “desired” indicator. 
 
COMMITMENT & POLICY 
B1 Publicly stated commitment to work against corruption in all its forms, including 
bribery and extortion  
B2 Commitment to be in compliance with all relevant laws, including anti-corruption 
laws  
D1 Publicly stated formal policy of zero-tolerance of corruption 
D2 Statement of support for international and regional legal frameworks, such as the 
UN Convention against Corruption 
D3 Carrying out risk assessment of potential areas of corruption 
D4 Detailed policies for high-risk areas of corruption 
D5 Policy on anti-corruption regarding business partners 
 
IMPLEMENTATION 
B3 Translation of the anti-corruption commitment into actions  
B4 Support by the organization’s leadership for anti-corruption  
B5 Communication and training on the anti-corruption commitment for all employees  
B6 Internal checks and balances to ensure consistency with 
the anti-corruption commitment  
D6 Actions taken to encourage business partners to implement 
anti-corruption commitments 
D7 Management responsibility and accountability for implementation of the anti-
corruption commitment or policy 
D8 Human Resources procedures supporting the anti-corruption commitment or 
policy 
D9 Communications (whistleblowing) channels and follow-up mechanisms for 
reporting concerns or seeking advice 
D10 Internal accounting and auditing procedures related to anticorruption 
D11 Participation in voluntary anti-corruption initiatives 
 
MONITORING 
B7 Monitoring and improvement processes  
D12 Leadership review of monitoring and improvement results 
D13 Dealing with incidents 
D14 Public legal cases regarding corruption 
D15 Use of independent external assurance of anti-corruption programs 
 
2.  Evaluation of Current Practices 
Currently, few corporations are providing significant disclosure on 
matters related to corruption. Transparency International recently 
conducted a review of five hundred companies’ disclosures on corruption 
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made in any form, including disclosures contained in annual reports, 
sustainability reports, and company websites.101 This study found that 
30% of the companies did not report any information on anti-corruption 
practices, and 20% simply reported the existence of an anti-corruption 
policy and strategy.102 Only 15% of the companies made any effort to go 
beyond reporting on basic matters.103 A second study found similar 
results. The research company Experts in Responsible Investment 
Solutions (EIRIS) looked at a sample of over six hundred companies104 
that were operating in high risk environments for corruption and found 
that only 1% of those companies demonstrated “good” disclosure and 
just 5% of companies met the organization’s standards of “intermediate” 
disclosure.105 The EIRIS standard for intermediate disclosure required the 
company to “publish at least some information relating to performance 
against this issue.”106  
Finally, a study of all types of disclosures by the largest fifty 
companies in Australia found similar shortcomings.107 Although many 
corporations were disclosing their policies against corrupt payments, 
significantly fewer provided details on how those policies were 
implemented or on the company’s actual performance outcomes.108 The 
study also found that companies in sectors at high risk for corrupt 
payments did not perform any different on average from the entire group 
of fifty corporations.109  
Overall, the organizations discussed above are conducting 
significant work on developing guidelines for what information should be 
disclosed on a corporation’s anti-corruption efforts.110 Studies have 
shown, however, that corporations are not disclosing this information, 
and what information is disclosed is of poor quality.111 Thus, it is 
 
 101. TRANSPARENCY INT’L, TRANSPARENCY IN REPORTING ON ANTI-CORRUPTION – 
A REPORT OF CORPORATE PRACTICES 7-10 (2009) available at 
http://www.transparency.org/publications/publications/2009_06_19_final_trac_report. Of 
the 500 companies included in the study, 120 were from the United States. Id. at 10. 
 102. See id. at 17. 
 103. See id. 
 104. GORDON, supra note 53, at 13. 
 105. Id. at 24. 
 106. Id. 
 107. See ASSOCIATION OF CERTIFIED CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS, ANTI-BRIBERY 
AND CORRUPTION REPORTING DISCLOSURES 5 (2008), available at 
http://www2.accaglobal.com/BandCRerport. The report judges the Australian Securities 
Exchange (ASX) top 50 against five groups of criteria, providing a detailed scoring 
methodology. Id. at 7-8. 
 108. See id. at 9 (showing an ASX top 50 average score of 74% for disclosure of anti-
bribery policies against an average score of 38% for disclosure of the implementation of 
those policies). 
 109. Id. at 11. 
 110. See supra notes 90–98 and accompanying text. 
 111. See supra notes 101–109 and accompanying text. 
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unlikely that this information is of use to stakeholders of the corporation. 
The next section focuses on how to improve disclosure and ensure that 
those disclosures are a valuable part of a regulatory system to combat 
corruption. 
IV.  USING ENFORCEMENT TO IMPROVE DISCLOSURE  
This article proposes a system in which the enforcement of anti-
corruption laws can be used to create incentives for better disclosure on 
corruption issues. This information can then be used to meet the needs of 
the potential users of social reports, as well as to further the goals of 
enforcement. This Part describes current FCPA enforcement practices, 
how disclosure requirements can fit within that process, and how those 
disclosures can help create a system that reduces corruption more 
effectively. 
A.  ENFORCEMENT OF ANTI-CORRUPTION LAWS 
When prosecutors at the DOJ believe that agents of a corporation 
have engaged in bribery and are considering indicting the company itself, 
they begin an evaluation process.112 Based on factors such as the 
pervasiveness of the wrongful conduct in the organization, the 
company’s cooperation in the investigation, and the adequacy of the 
company’s compliance and ethics program, prosecutors will decide 
whether to prosecute the corporation itself, agree to a settlement with the 
corporation, or prosecute only the individuals involved.113 The SEC uses 
a similar approach.114 
In the last few years it has been increasingly common for 
corporations accused of violations of the FCPA to agree to settlements, in 
the form of deferred prosecution agreements or non-prosecution 
agreements.115 As part of such a settlement, the corporation typically 
 
 112. See, e.g., Cristie Ford & David Hess, Can Corporate Monitorships Improve 
Corporate Compliance, 34 J. CORP. L. 679, 697-98 (2009) (describing the factors that 
regulators evaluate when deciding whether to impose monitorships on companies). 
 113. See, e.g., Preet Bharara, Corporations Cry Uncle and Their Employees Cry Foul: 
Rethinking Prosecutorial Pressure on Corporate Defendants, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 53, 
78–81 (2007) (describing the factors outlined in the Thompson and McNulty Memoranda 
that prosecutors should take into consideration when deciding whether to prosecute the 
corporate entity rather than individuals within the company). 
 114. Id. at 77 n.128. 
 115. See Melissa Aguilar, Prosecution Agreements Nearing Record Levels at DoJ, 
COMPLIANCE WK., Feb. 2011, at 10, 10-11; GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, 2010 
YEAR-END UPDATE ON DEFERRED PROSECUTION AND NON-PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS 
2–4 (Jan. 4, 2011), available at 
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/2010Year-EndUpdate-
CorporateDeferredProsecutionAndNon-ProsecutionAgreements.pdf (describing the sharp 
increase in usage of settlement agreements, with settlements of FCPA violations 
representing as many as 50% of such agreements). 
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admits wrongdoing and agrees to improve its compliance and ethics 
program in specified ways.116 In many cases, the corporation also agrees 
to hire an independent monitor to oversee the design and implementation 
of those improvements.117 The exact terms of these settlement 
agreements depend in part on the perceived quality of the corporation’s 
current compliance program.118 
A settlement agreement is a burdensome process for a corporation, 
but it is a significantly better alternative than a criminal indictment, 
which can bar a corporation from government contracts and cause it other 
problems.119 Thus, corporations have a strong incentive to take steps to 
maximize the likelihood that the government will agree to a settlement if 
the corporation is caught paying a bribe—steps which include self-
disclosure. Ten years ago hopes of a settlement would not have been a 
significant incentive for corporations to take preventative action, since 
the government rarely brought charges under the FCPA, but that is no 
longer true, as these charges are now more common and may continue to 
increase.120  
For several reasons, this increased FCPA enforcement will likely 
continue in the next few years. First, other countries are showing signs of 
enforcing their anti-corruption laws, meaning that the United States may 
pursue enforcement in cooperation with other government agencies, since 
corporations paying bribes may be liable under multiple jurisdictions.121 
 
 116. Hess & Ford, supra note 10, at 332–333. 
 117. Id. For an overview and analysis of the settlement process and requirements 
(though, not limited to FCPA cases), see generally Jayne W. Barnard, Corporate 
Therapeutics at the Securities and Exchange Commission, 2008 COLUM. BUS. L.. REV. 
793 (2008) (outlining the SEC’s use of “Corporate Therapeutics” as part of its settlement 
agreements and analyzing the various factors and levels of involvement it undertakes when 
addressing corporate corruption); Ford & Hess, supra note 112 (discussing the role of 
corporate monitorships in negotiated settlement agreements); Peter Spivack & Sujit 
Raman, Regulating the 'New Regulators': Current Trends in Deferred Prosecution 
Agreements, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 159, 159–61 (2008) (providing an overview of how 
deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements look in practice in the context of the 
DOJ’s new attitude toward corporate reform); Leonard Orland, The Transformation of 
Corporate Criminal Law, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 45 (2006) (discussing 
developments at the DOJ to give it more discretion when confronting corporate crime, 
including deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements). For a discussion of 
settlements in the FCPA context, see Giudice, supra note 2, at 366–68. 
 118. E.g., F. Joseph Warin et al., Somebody’s Watching Me: FCPA Monitorships and 
How They Can Work Better, 13 U. PENN. J. BUS. L. 321, 337 (2011) (describing the effect 
a perception of a good compliance program may have on a prosecutor’s decision of 
whether to seek to impose a monitor requirement in a settlement agreement). 
 119. See Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, supra note 115, at 1. 
 120. See Warin et al., supra note 118, at 325 (describing the dormancy of FCPA 
enforcement until the past decade when the DOJ and SEC began setting records for the 
number of FCPA enforcement actions they brought). 
 121. TRANSPARENCY INT’L, PROGRESS REPORT 2010: ENFORCEMENT OF THE OECD 
ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION 8 (July 28, 2010), available at 
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Second, the SEC has recently established a new division focused on 
FCPA enforcement, and the DOJ is devoting more resources to this 
area.122 Third, the recently-passed financial reform bill, the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, grants to 
whistleblowers who expose securities law violations, including FCPA 
violations, a percentage of any monetary sanctions imposed against the 
corporation.123 Because fines in some cases can measure in the tens of 
millions,124 this potentially creates a strong incentive for employees and 
agents of corporations to report wrongdoing. 
B.  USING ENFORCEMENT TO IMPROVE DISCLOSURE 
The leverage provided by the government’s ability to make 
prosecution and settlement decisions puts the United States in a strong 
position to improve public disclosure of anti-corruption practices by 
including and elevating such disclosure as a decision factor in the 
settlement or prosecution of FCPA violations. The government should 
use its leverage to improve CSR reporting by formally including 
corporate disclosure consistent with the anti-corruption indicators from 
the GRI and the UN Global Compact125—as well as the use of 
independent external assurance on those disclosures126—as additional 
factors to consider when making prosecution decisions. Factors such as 
the adequacy of the company’s compliance and ethics program would 
continue to be important, but they would also be supported by disclosure. 
Disclosure can enhance the effectiveness of these factors by providing 
 
http://www.transparency.org/publications/publications/conventions/oecd_report_2010 
(“The increase in the number of countries with active enforcement from four to seven is a 
very positive development . . . . [T]here is now active enforcement in countries 
representing about 30 per cent of world exports . . . .”). The 2011 report, however, showed 
no further progress and expressed concerns that there may be a loss of momentum in 
obtaining stricter enforcement from other OECD countries. TRANSPARENCY INT’L, 
PROGRESS REPORT 2011: ENFORCEMENT OF THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION 5 
(2011), available at 
http://www.transparency.org/publications/publications/conventions/oecd_report_2011. 
 122. Westbrook, supra note 2, at 558–59. 
 123. See id. at 525 (describing the monetary incentives as the Dodd-Frank 
whistleblower “bounty program”). 
 124. See, e.g., Giudice, supra note 2, at 348–49 (describing combined settlements of 
over $1 billion dollars in connection with Siemens A.G. Corporation’s FCPA violations); 
Rollo C. Baker, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 647, 676–677 
(2009) (outlining the Lockheed Corp. and Vetco Int’l Ltd. settlements of $24.8 million and 
$26 million respectively). 
 125. Though these indicators could potentially be adapted to meet the government’s 
assessment needs. 
 126. Assurance involves auditing the information disclosed to ensure that it is 
complete and reliable. See, e.g., Giacomo Manetti & Lucia Becatti, Assurance Services for 
Sustainability Reports: Standards and Empirical Evidence, 87 J. BUS. ETHICS 289, 290 
(2009) (outlining the basic elements of external verification as required by the ISAE 3000 
established by the Institute of Social and Ethical Accountability). 
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evidence of an appropriately implemented program, as opposed to a 
compliance program that exists on paper but is not meaningfully 
implemented in practice. Disclosure will also aid the government in 
determining the adequacy of the program over time. For example, if in 
2010 the government becomes aware that a corporation paid bribes in 
2007, disclosures will assist the government in determining if the 
corporation has improved its compliance program since that time, 
reducing the risk of paying similar bribes in the future. 
Support for this proposal comes from former General Counsel of the 
SEC, James R. Doty.127 Although this article’s proposal arises out of a 
link between CSR and legal mechanisms, described more fully in the 
next subsection, and Doty’s proposal arises out of his critical assessment 
of current enforcement practices,128 the proposals have general similarity 
in the means to achieve their goals, which is improved information 
disclosure. Doty argues that out of fairness to corporations and 
competitiveness concerns (e.g., allowing corporations to better plan 
strategies when operating in corrupt countries), there needs to be greater 
clarity and certainty in FCPA enforcement.129 To achieve this, Doty 
argues for a “Reg. FCPA” approach.130 Under this approach, once the 
corporation has provided disclosures that demonstrate to the SEC that it 
has implemented an effective FCPA compliance program,  the 
corporation receives a rebuttable presumption that it did not violate the 
FCPA if a company employee is later found to have paid a bribe.131 Doty 
proposes two types of disclosures: public and private.132 The public 
disclosures would contain a description of the corporation’s compliance 
program, including its code of conduct, training policies, and monitoring 
practices.133 Private disclosures to the government would relate to 
specific projects in foreign countries (e.g., budgets, joint venture partners 
 
 127. Doty, supra note 6, at 1233 n.*. 
 128. Doty places his criticisms of FCPA enforcement into three categories: “(i) trends 
in the imposition of civil liability on a parent issuer for acts of a subsidiary's employee or 
agent in the absence of active complicity of the parent, and in some cases where the 
actions of employees and agents contravene established, company-wide policies; (ii) 
prosecution on aggressive theories extending beyond traditional bribery (which 
underscores the need for prospective regulatory clarification of permitted activities); and, 
(iii) the expansive criminalization of vicarious liability under a vague statute, in some 
cases where there is not certainty that a bribe has been offered or paid by the corporation.” 
Id. at 1235. Doty goes on to state that “[t]hese emerging characteristics of the enforcement 
regime are combining to threaten U.S. foreign competitiveness with a growing risk of 
exclusion of U.S. companies from foreign markets.” Id. at 1239. 
 129. See id. at 1237–38, 1241 (suggesting that current levels of FCPA penalties alone 
merit more regulatory clarity, and suggesting the example of the SEC’s rebuttable 
presumption rules as a way of providing some of that clarity). 
 130. Id. at 1234. 
 131. Id. at 1234, 1245. 
 132. Doty, supra note 6, at 1244–46. 
 133. Id. at 1244. 
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and local agent contract terms) and would afford the company the 
possibility of a “no-action” review by the SEC (i.e., advice from the SEC 
on whether a proposed course of action would be viewed by the SEC as 
violating the FCPA).134 These disclosures would remain confidential, but 
would give the SEC a greater understanding of potentially problematic 
international transactions.135  
C.  THE BENEFITS OF DISCLOSURE 
From a regulatory perspective, transparency through non-financial 
reporting can be classified as a form of New Governance regulation,136 
an umbrella term used to describe models of regulation that share some 
basic principles137 aimed at “decentering” the law.138 Instead of being set 
by the government in a centralized fashion, standards are allowed to 
develop through experimentation at the local level.139 Those at the local 
level—the corporation and its stakeholders—have the best information 
about the issues and potential solutions, and therefore need to be directly 
involved in setting the appropriate standards.140 Any standards set by the 
participants are deemed provisional and are updated based on new 
knowledge and the demands of changing circumstances over time.141 The 
role of the government is to “orchestrate” this process, by ensuring that 
there is appropriate opportunity for participation, by ensuring that 
mechanisms exist to allow best practices at one location to be captured 
and made available for use at other locations, and by providing a 
backdrop of appropriate sanctions when necessary.142 
 
 134. Id. at 1246. 
 135. Id. 
 136. See generally Hess, Three Pillars, supra note 65 (examining corporate social 
reporting as a form of New Governance); David Hess, Social Reporting and New 
Governance Regulation: The Prospects of Achieving Corporate Accountability through 
Transparency, 17 BUS. ETHICS Q. 453 (2007) [hereinafter Hess, Social Reporting] 
(arguing that social reporting can be an important form of New Governance). 
 137. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Reply: “New Governance” in Legal Thought and in 
the World: Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 MINN. L. REV. 471, 
472–74 (2004). See generally Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and 
the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004) 
(providing an overview and synthesis of the work in this area). 
 138. See David Hess, Public Pensions and the Promise of Shareholder Activism for 
the Next Frontier of Corporate Governance: Sustainable Economic Development, 2 VA. L. 
& BUS. REV. 221, 232 (2007) [hereinafter Hess, Public Pensions]. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Hess, Three Pillars, supra note 65, at 451 (describing the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA’s) attempt to work with corporations it regulated when setting 
emissions standards). 
 141. Hess, Social Reporting, supra note 136¸at 455. 
 142. See Katherine R. Kruse, Instituting Innocence Reform: Wisconsin’s New 
Governance Experiment, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 645, 677–80 (2006) (discussing the ability of 
“democratic experimentalism” to promote broad participation, capture best-case-practices, 
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The basic pillars of transparency, as a New Governance method, 
are: disclosure, dialogue, and development.143 The first pillar—
disclosure—requires that corporations provide meaningful information 
on their policies, management practices, and the outcomes they have 
achieved.144 Disclosure enables stakeholders to hold the corporation 
accountable by comparing the corporation’s stated goals to its actual 
performance and the performance of other corporations. It also helps to 
improve other corporations’ performance145 because disclosure allows 
stakeholder groups, including other similarly-situated corporations, to 
examine solutions to the same problem. Due to their different areas of 
expertise, these groups may uncover different patterns, risks, harms, and 
solutions.146 For example, Doty suggests that “claw back” provisions in 
contracts—where the local party agrees to reimburse the corporation for 
any FCPA liabilities—and other contractual tools may be beneficial.147 
Disclosure assists the spread of these provisions by increasing awareness 
of them as a solution, and by showing contracting parties that they are 
legitimate and widely used provisions.148 Disclosure also allows third 
parties, such as interested NGOs,149 to monitor the use, variation, 
effectiveness, and potential unintended consequences of the practices.150 
These stakeholders can then help critically assess, develop, and spread 
best practices.151 
Disclosure leads to the second pillar—dialogue—which requires 
corporations to engage with their stakeholders.152 Disclosure provides the 
basis for dialogue with stakeholders, such as institutional investors 
working through the U.N. Principles for Responsible Investment, 
transnational NGOs such as Transparency International, or local 
government and special interest groups.153 The nature of these dialogues 
is described below.154 In addition, it encourages corporations to 
participate in multi-stakeholder groups (another form of dialogue) by 
 
and ensure proper accountability). 
 143. See Hess, Three Pillars, supra note 65, at 453. 
 144. See id. at 457–58. See Table 1 for an overview of the types of information 
corporations should disclose. 
 145. Id. at 457. 
 146. See John T. Scholz, Enforcement Policy and Corporate Misconduct: The 
Changing Perspective of Deterrence Theory, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 253, 258 
(1997). 
 147. See Doty, supra note 6, at 1248. 
 148. See id. 
 149. See infra Part IV.C.2. 
 150. See Hess, Three Pillars, supra note 65, at 451, 457. 
 151. See id. 
 152. Id. at 459. 
 153. See id. at 458–59. 
 154. See infra Parts IV.C.1, IV.C.2. 
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disclosing their participation in such groups.155 
The third pillar—development—refers to the moral development of 
the corporation, which results from managing corporate culture and 
implementing an effective ethics and compliance program.156 The 
corporation must commit to anti-corruption and must develop an 
effective compliance and ethics program that ensures employees are 
trained in anti-bribery laws, that employees have the appropriate 
incentives to resist making bribes when demanded by government 
officials, and that internal controls are in place to help prevent wrongful 
payments.157 One of the advantages of New Governance regulation is its 
flexibility in allowing corporations to respond to their unique situations 
in the manner that is most effective and efficient for them.158 This is 
especially important in the area of anti-corruption, because, while 
effective compliance programs may share some basic features among 
most corporations, the programs must also be adapted to each 
corporation’s unique situation.159 
The guidance document published by Transparency International 
and the United Nations Global Compact160 further demonstrates how 
these three pillars—disclosure, dialogue, and development—can work 
together in the area of anti-corruption.161 The report explains the 
following internal benefits for the corporation: 
Formalized and consistent reporting on anti-corruption activities, integrated into 
already established reporting processes (e.g., accounting), ensures reliable and 
measurable internal operations. It shows to employees that the fight against 
corruption is taken very seriously (“What gets measured gets done”). This 
results in the following benefits: 
 strengthening anti-corruption behaviour, including better risk 
management and compliance; 
 encouraging and supporting employees in resisting corruption; 
 providing management with a foundation for analysis of progress, 
planning and continuous improvement; and motivating employees to be proud of 
the organization’s integrity and reputation.162 
The report also states benefits external to the corporation: 
 
 155. See Hess, Three Pillars, supra note 65, at 457. Examples of multi-stakeholder 
initiatives include World Economic Forum’s Partnering Against Corruption Initiative 
(PACI) and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. 
 156. See id. at 460–462. 
 157. See generally Hess & Ford, supra note 8 (discussing the importance of employee 
training for the reduction of corruption and bribery). 
 158. See Hess, Three Pillars, supra note 65, at 460. 
 159. Hess & Ford, supra note 8, at 332. 
 160. See U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT, REPORTING GUIDANCE, supra note 97. 
 161. See supra notes 144–159 and accompanying text (describing the meanings of 
disclosure, dialogue, and development in this context). 
 162. U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT, REPORTING GUIDANCE, supra note 97, at 10 (emphasis 
omitted). 
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[R]eporting on anti-corruption activities based on a consistent reporting 
guidance enables different stakeholders to share information, raise awareness, 
learn from each other and improve practices. Stakeholders, as well as each 
individual organization, can benefit from this in multiple ways: 
 sharing experience and procedures with other organizations; 
 stimulating multi-stakeholder dialogues; 
 increasing importance of disclosure on anti-corruption activities in 
overall sustainability agendas; and 
 driving media coverage of good anti-corruption practices through 
provision of comparable progress reports.163 
All of the goals described in this section are consistent with the 
government’s enforcement objectives. The required disclosures are 
mechanisms to reinforce the corporation’s own anti-corruption 
commitment, and they assist the corporation in improving its compliance 
program.164 In addition, the disclosures draw in other stakeholders to 
assist in holding corporations accountable, so that external stakeholders 
serve as surrogate regulators.165 These stakeholders can engage in 
dialogues with corporations to assist and push those corporations to 
improve on the development pillar.166 The next section describes the two 
most important stakeholder groups: shareholders and NGOs. It shows 
that there are important and powerful stakeholder groups in place that 
will likely act upon this disclosure proposal and assist in achieving the 
regulatory goals. 
1.  Surrogate Regulator: Shareholders 
Formerly, the consideration of ESG issues was the domain only of 
so-called socially responsible investors.167 Now, however, many 
institutional investors incorporate ESG issues into their investment 
decision making for purposes of risk management and value creation.168 
For example, one major initiative—the United Nations Principles for 
Responsible Investment (UN PRI)—states that holders of over $22 
trillion in assets have pledged to follow its investment principles, which 
require the incorporation of ESG issues into investment analyses.169 In 
 
 163. Id. at 11. 
 164. See supra notes 143–162 and accompanying text. 
 165. On the use of stakeholders as surrogate regulators, see generally Neil 
Gunningham et al., Harnessing Third Parties as Surrogate Regulators: Achieving 
Environmental Outcomes by Alternative Means, 8 BUS. STRATEGY & ENV’T 211 (1999). 
 166. Hess, Three Pillars, supra note 65, at 460–62. 
 167. E. James M. Gifford, Effective Shareholder Engagement: The Factors that 
Contribute to Shareholder Salience, 92 J. BUS. ETHICS 79, 79 (2010). 
 168. Hess, Public Pensions, supra note 138, at  223. 
 169. U.N. PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INV., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRI 
INITIATIVE, 1 (2010), available at http://www.unpri.org/files/annual_report2010.pdf 
(stating that “around US$ 22 trillion of assets have been signed up to the Principles for 
Responsible Investment (PRI). This is more than 10% of total global capital markets . . . 
.”) For a listing of the principles, see Principles for Responsible Investment, U.N. 
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addition to using ESG factors in investment decision making, these 
shareholders often engage directly with corporations to push for 
improvements.170  
Recently, in connection with the greater recognition of corruption as 
a CSR issue, these investors have started considering corporations’ 
efforts to combat corruption as one of the ESG factors.171 For example, in 
2006,172 a well-known investing index that screens corporations based on 
their social and environmental performance—the  FTSE4Good Index—
started applying a set of “countering bribery criteria” to companies 
deemed to be at high risk for corrupt payments due to factors such as 
their industry, countries of operation, and amount of public contracts.173 
The criteria include corporations’ policies against corrupt payments and 
their management of these issues within the company.174 
Some of these institutional investors have already begun to demand 
greater information on corporations’ anti-corruption practices. In 2010, a 
group of these investors—coordinating their efforts through the UN 
PRI—wrote letters to various companies demanding improved disclosure 
of their anti-corruption efforts.175 An investment manager quoted in the 
press release announcing the letters stated, “bribery and corruption are 
incompatible with good corporate governance and harmful to the creation 
of value.”176  The manager went on to state that the failure to implement 
an effective anti-corruption program “has the potential to create financial, 
operational and reputational risks.”177 That press release also specifically 
mentions the work done by the International Corporate Governance 
 
PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INV., http://www.unpri.org/principles/ (last visited Sept. 23, 
2011). 
 170. For an overview of shareholder engagement, see generally, Gifford, supra note 
167; Rory Sullivan & Craig Mackenzie, Can Investor Activism Play a Meaningful Role in 
Addressing Market Failure?, 31 J. CORP. CITIZENSHIP 77 (2008). 
 171. See Virginia Haufler, Disclosure as Governance: The Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative and Resource Management in the Developing World, 10 GLOBAL 
ENVTL. POL. 53, 65 (2010) (discussing investors’ support of the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative, which works to reduce corruption in developing nations that have 
significant stores of natural resources). 
 172. Press Release, FTSE, FTSE Group Introduces New Anti-Bribery Criteria to its 
FTSE4Good Series (Feb. 22, 2006),  
http://www.ftse.com/News/Archive/20060222FTSE4Goodbribery.jsp. On the FTSE4Good 
index in general, see David Collison et al., FTSE4Good: Exploring its Implications for 
Corporate Conduct, 22 ACCT., AUDITING & ACCOUNTABILITY J. 35 (2009). 
 173. FTSE, COUNTERING BRIBERY CRITERIA, available at 
http://www.ftse.com/Indices/FTSE4Good_Index_Series/Downloads/FTSE4Good_Counter
ing_Bribery_Criteria.pdf. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Media Release, U.N. Principles for Responsible Inv., Global Investors Ask 
Companies to Disclose Anti-Corruption Measures (Apr. 27, 2010), available at 
http://www.unpri.org/files/20100427_AnticorruptionPR_final.pdf. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
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Network (ICGN)—a group that consists of a significant number of major 
institutional investors.178 In a recent report,179 the ICGN identifies 
corruption as an activity that “destroys value, both at a macroeconomic 
level and at an individual company level.”180 
2.  Surrogate Regulator: NGOs 
NGOs have a long history of pushing for improved social 
performance from corporations.181 They serve many roles, including 
providing information to corporations and regulators, placing pressure on 
corporations to change their behavior, influencing consumers and other 
external stakeholders, and serving a watchdog role.182 In the area of 
corruption, the most well-known NGO is Transparency International 
(TI).183 TI is involved in a wide range of activities at the international 
level and has numerous local chapters which deal with issues specific to 
particular countries.184 It is also actively committed to working with 
corporations to improve their anti-corruption efforts. TI’s recent annual 
report states: 
As business must play a role in fighting corruption, TI helps companies work 
together with stakeholders to devise voluntary codes, methods for tackling 
bribery and corruption, and initiatives to promote transparency, which need to be 
externally verified to be credible.  
  TI chapters also work to develop context-specific approaches to private 
sector corruption, especially in developing countries, enabling TI to maximise its 
impact in squeezing corruption out of business.185 
In addition to TI, there are many others. A 2009 review of 
developments surrounding the FCPA stated: 
One of the more significant developments in the international anti-corruption 
movement is the growth and influence of civil society in efforts to combat 
 
 178. Id. The ICGN is a “not for profit body founded in 1995 which has evolved into a 
global membership organisation of over 500 leaders in corporate governance in 50 
countries, with institutional investors representing assets under management of around 
US$12 trillion.” Facts About IGCN, INT’L CORPORATE GOVERNANCE NETWORK 
http://www.icgn.org/facts-about-icgn.php (last visited Nov. 11, 2011). 
 179. INT’L CORPORATE GOVERNANCE NETWORK, ICGN STATEMENT AND GUIDANCE 
ON ANTI-CORRUPTION PRACTICES (Mar. 2009), available at 
http://www.icgn.org/files/icgn_main/pdfs/best_practice/guidance_on_anti-
corruption_practices/2009_anti-corruption_practices_(march).pdf. 
 180. Id. at 5. 
 181. See Gunningham et al., supra note 165, at 212. 
 182. Id. at 212–13. 
 183. The website of Transparency International is located at 
http://www.transparency.org/. 
 184. Transparency International has chapters in approximately 90 countries. About Us, 
TRANSPARENCY INT’L, http://www.transparency.org/about_us (last visited Sept. 23, 
2011). The goals of these chapters are to “bring together relevant players from 
government, civil society, business and the media to promote transparency in elections, in 
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 185. TRANSPARENCY INT’L, ANNUAL REPORT 2009 17 (2009), available at 
http://www.transparency.org/publications/annual_report. 
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corruption and bribery. Nongovernmental organizations and business 
associations including the Center for International Private Enterprises, Corner 
House, Global Witness, the International Chamber of Commerce Anti-
Corruption Commission, and TRACE have exposed corruption issues, advocated 
changes in policy, and provided support to private companies.186  
Thus, there are numerous NGOs already seeking to serve a 
meaningful role as a surrogate regulator. There are several ways the 
government can facilitate the involvement of NGOs, but an important 
way is by providing “greater access to the prime currency of public 
interest groups: information.”187 The quote above from TI188 shows that 
NGOs are actively pushing for increased transparency from corporations.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
In the area of anti-corruption, it is clear that government 
enforcement agencies can take actions that will improve their 
enforcement efforts and at the same time further CSR initiatives that 
serve the same general goals. Corporate disclosure of efforts to combat 
corruption can further enforcement activities, while also supporting a 
CSR initiative designed to hold corporations accountable for their anti-
corruption efforts by opening up dialogue with stakeholders who can 
assess these efforts and distribute knowledge of best practices. By 
working with the GRI, institutional investors, NGOs, and others, the 
government can ensure that any encouraged disclosures are valuable to 
these potential users of the information, supporting a beneficial CSR 
initiative in the challenging fight against corruption. 
 
 
 186.   David E. Dworsky, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 671, 
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